Want to stop the next riot at a U.S. embassy? The commission into the September assault on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi has an unexpected suggestion: load them up with exotic, supposedly non-lethal weaponry. Not that the commission has much confidence in the security personnel who'd operate the controversial gear.
In its newly released report into the Benghazi disaster, an independent commission assembled by the State Department found that, among other security failures, 'the lack of non-lethal crowd control options' at the consulate 'precluded a more vigorous defense.' (.pdf) The September attack, in which Libyans assaulted the sparsely defended consulate with rockets, mortars, machine-gun fire and more, killed four Americans, including U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens.
The commission doesn't explicitly endorse any particular form of non-lethal defense of diplomatic installations. But the obvious options would be a laser flash that 'dazzles' oncoming attackers, an ear-splitting sonic blaster ' and a microwave-like pain ray that make targets feel like they're being hit with the exhaust of a giant oven. The first two weapons have been used by U.S. military forces overseas in recent years. The third one was pulled from Afghanistan because it was considered too controversial.
The commission does not consider such weaponry a panacea. It does find that the State Department is behind the curve on exploring how those technologies, however. 'There have been technological advancements in non-lethal deterrents,' it writes, 'and the State Department should ensure it rapidly and routinely identifies and procures additional options for non-lethal deterrents in high risk, high threat posts and trains personnel on their use.'
The U.S. military has been experimenting with non-lethal crowd control systems for years. One of the marquee projects of its Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate is a millimeter-wave gun called the Active Denial System. Intended for the perimeter defense of a base, the truck-mounted weapon blasts angry mobs with 12 joules of focused energy per square centimeter. The blast doesn't penetrate the skin, but ' as I learned first-hand in March ' it very rapidly creates an unbearable burning sensation, prompting anyone in its path to involuntarily move out of the way.
Another non-lethal option: sonic blasters like the Long-Range Acoustic Device or the Inferno, which cause, in the words of Danger Room co-founder Sharon Weinberger, 'the most unbearable, gut-wrenching noise I've ever heard in my life.' The Long-Range Acoustic Device, for instance, fires sound waves at a 300-meter distance, and has been used against pirates; a related Israeli weapon, called the Scream, was put to work in 2009 to literally nauseate protesters.
But the commission's brief plaudit for less-lethal weaponry doesn't consider some of the very real drawbacks of these systems, both technical and, er, diplomatic. The commission notes that the Benghazi attack happened too quickly for the U.S. military to respond to. That would also be too fast for the Active Denial System, which needs a 16-hour boot-up time if the energy-intensive device isn't constantly running. It also doesn't work as well in dusty, rainy, snowy or other poor-weather conditions.
Then there are the diplomatic problems with the weapons. The Active Denial System was recalled from Afghanistan after a brief deployment in 2010 out of fear that the Taliban would effectively portray it as a sterilization device. Mounting one of these on the walls of an embassy would not exactly send the message that the U.S. is eager to work with the locals on matters of mutual interest.
But the Benghazi commission also provides little confidence in the security officers who'd have to operate and oversee the non-lethal weapons. The State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security comes across in the commission's report as barely able to manage the resources that it already has. Not only did the Benghazi consulate depend on a 'poorly skilled' Libyan militia and unarmed guards from the Blue Mountain security firm, the commission found the Diplomatic Security bureau needs to 'upgrade surveillance cameras at high risk, high threat posts for greater resolution, nighttime visibility, and monitoring capability beyond post'; create an 'action plan' about what to do about 'the use of fire as a weapon against diplomatic facilities'; and 'revisit [its] high-threat training with respect to active internal defense and fire survival.'
That makes it sound like the Bureau of Diplomatic Security is under-prepared at the basics of protecting diplomatic outposts. And it's not the first time the directorate has come in for criticism. A 2007 State Department inquiry found that the bureau exercised inadequate oversight of its private security force in Iraq, owing to under-staffing and meager budgets. (That's something Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is asking Congress to correct.) In Afghanistan, Diplomatic Security contracted out for embassy guards that couldn't speak English, despite repeated warnings from embassy personnel that such a move jeopardized an effective response to a crisis.
Veterans of the bureau describe a hidebound bureaucracy insulated from accountability, especially as it had always succeeded at its core job of keeping diplomats alive. Until Benghazi.
'The [Diplomatic Security] Bureau showed a lack of proactive senior leadership with respect to Benghazi,' the commission writes, 'failing to ensure that the priority security needs of a high risk, high threat post were met.' The commission, however, stops short at recommending anyone inside the bureau be fired over Benghazi, punting on that suggestion to 'future' studies. But the report appears to have prompted the resignations of top Diplomatic Security officials, including Amb. Eric Boswell. Not exactly the people you'd want manning your acoustic cannons and heat rays.
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